We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The "concentration of political power" is the extent to which rent-seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions respectively are limited.
Introduction
The concern of international organizations for fighting corruption is supported by a large volume of empirical research measuring its devastating effect on economic performance and growth. These studies were made possible by the increasing number and quality of measures of corruption (see the indicators of the World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide, and the corruption perceptions index from Transparency International, to mention aggregate measures only).
The way corruption is modeled in theory is however not yet firmly established. Two different strategies have been followed in the literature. Most of the theory of corruption has been developed in a static context and focuses on incentives, information and enforcement determining corrupt practices, mainly due to market failures (Shleifer and Vishny 1993 , Banerjee 1997 , Acemoglu and Verdier 2000 . A key element in this literature is that individuals face a choice between different activities, including productive and rent-seeking activities. A minor strand of the literature is devoted to the dynamics and growth aspects of corruption activities, using dynamic general equilibrium modeling. But in these studies, corruption is either exogenous, or a by-product of another activity, and households are not subject to incentive constraints. For example in Le Van and Maurel (2006) , corruption is identical to an (exogenous) productivity parameter, whose consequences for catching-up and convergence are analyzed. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) build a growth model with thresholds in human capital, generating two equilibria, one with corruption and one without. Corruption is a direct product of government size, which is set arbitrarily. Another endogenous growth model is proposed by Mohtadi and Roe (2003) . In this model, the equilibrium size of the rent-seeking sector depends on the "state of democracy" which is related to the flow of information and access to the government. Eicher, García-Peñalosa, and van Ypersele (2006) postulate two exogenous types of politicians: honest and dishonest ones. The dishonest ones can nevertheless imitate the honest ones if certain incentives are available.
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In this paper, we explicitly introduce an incentive constraint into a dynamic optimization program. In doing so we bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. This way of setting the problem has important consequences both in theory and for empirical analysis. A key implication is to distinguish the prevailing level of corruption, which is an endogenous variable determined at equilibrium, from its institutional factors. Here we concentrate on two institutional parameters. We use the term "technology of corruption" to denote the ease with which rent-seekers can capture part of public spending; it depends on the legal framework and its implementation. The "concentration of political power" is defined as the extent to which rent-seekers have more political influence than other people.
One prediction of our theory is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that hold at equilibrium. In other words, the model displays several regimes with different properties. The combination of failing legal and political institutions should have more detrimental effects on income growth.
At the empirical level it seems necessary to estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously by the quality of institutions and other exogenous factors. In particular, we will show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal institutions in a context of failing political institutions and vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the structure of the model. The resolution of the dynamic problem is proposed in Section 2, with a characterization of the different regimes. In Section 3, we report empirical estimations of the main implications of the model, including the description of data, instruments, and tests.
Section 5 presents our conclusion.
Technology, Preferences, and Voting Equilibrium
The model is set up in discrete time. The economy is populated by a mass of identical households of measure N t growing at rate n. Households choose between working either in the productive sector or in the rent-seeking activity (in this paper we treat rent-seeking and corruption as synonymous). We denote by 1 − x t the proportion of the population in the productive sector, and by x t the proportion in the rent-seeking sector. The model can also be interpreted as if each household was allocating its time optimally between the two activities.
Technology
Public capital K t is the only stock of capital in this economy. Investment spending is denoted I t . Corruption acts as a tax on investment I t . Rent-seekers are able to extract some of the public investment I t , which is proportional to their fraction of population. Only a fraction 1 − νx t of investment spending is effectively invested while νx t I t accrues as income for rent-seekers. The parameter ν ≥ 0 reflects the corruption technology of the economy. It is positively related to the ease with which rent-seekers can divert resources. The value 1/ν should be interpreted as the proportion of rentseekers "needed" to divert 100% of investment. The law of motion of capital is:
with parameter δ being the depreciation rate (δ ∈ (0, 1)). Denoting the per-capita variables as k t = K t /N t and i t = I t /N t , the law of motion of capital can be rewritten as:
There is one physical good which is used for consumption and investment. Total production Q t depends positively on labor input N t (1−x t ) and on services from capital.
The production function is written as the product of two terms: Arrow and Kurz (1970) and Barro (1990) , public capital enters the production function directly. We assume that the product b[N t (1 − x t )]f [K t ] is homogeneous of degree one with respect to labor input N t (1 − x t ) and capital input K t which allows the output per person q t = Q t /N t to be written as:
Public investment spending is financed by a lump sum tax T t paid by every citizen:
An alternative would be to tax only people in the productive sector which would introduce an additional channel through which corruption could play a role, i.e. by reducing the fiscal base of the government. To keep the model as simple as possible we abstract from other types of public spending and from public debt.
Preferences and Incentives
At each date, households consume their income. Income includes either the product of corruption or the return from the productive activity. Their preferences are represented by a CIES utility function u[.] with inter-temporal elasticity of substitution σ. The utility of working in the productive sector U t is equal to the utility of the income in this sector. We assume that firms operating in this sector are owned by the workers, or, in other words, everybody is self-employed. Workers are thus paid the average product
. They also pay taxes T t . Net income per person is thus
The utility in the productive sector is given by:
The utility in the rent-seeking sector V t is the utility associated with the income from corruption, net of taxes. Since total income from corruption is νx t i t , the income per person is νi t , as long as x t ≤ 1/ν. If x t = 1/ν, all spending i t is diverted by rentseekers, and there is no incentive for the marginal person to move into rent-seeking.
Then,
The individual utility from corruption V t does not depend on the proportion of the population which is corrupt for x t ≤ 1/ν but decreases to 0 as soon as x t is larger than 1/ν. The utility from the productive sector U t is a positive function of x t . Indeed, because of marginal decreasing returns to labor, the function Γ[1 − x t ] is decreasing in 1 − x t . It decreases from +∞ when 1 − x t = 0 to Γ[1]. Three cases may arise.
In the first case, the return in the rent-seeking sector is always dominated by that in the productive sector even when the whole workforce is in the productive sector. In this case, we have
In such a situation, corruption does not exist at all. Condition 3 can be understood as a condition on the parameter ν relative to the function b [.] . If ν is large enough, i.e. if the corruption technology is efficient enough, this corner situation will never prevail.
In the second case, there is a value x ⋆ t ∈ (0, 1) for which the utility from the two activities is equal at equilibrium. If corruption at equilibrium satisfies x t ∈ (0, 1/ν), then the following constraint holds:
Condition (4) states that, at equilibrium, there is a relationship between the share of the population in the rent-seeking sector (x t ) and public capital (k t ), the effectiveness of corruption technology (ν), and the amount of public spending subject to corruption (i t ). This relation, which describes the choice of activity by households, will act as a constraint for the political economy problem and makes the level of corruption endogenous. We label it the incentive constraint.
In the third case, the income possibilities from rent-seeking are exhausted: x * t = 1/ν. In this case we have
In this case, investment i is entirely diverted, implying that the stock of capital k shrinks. Finally, there is a fourth possibility with
; this would be a situation where rent-seeking was more profitable than productive activity, but where the corruption possibilities were completely exhausted, so that those who worked in the productive sector had a lower income which was still better than the zero income they would have got if they had chosen rent-seeking for themselves.
If the situation described in the latter two cases persists, income in the productive sector tends to zero, which cannot be an optimal solution. Hence these regimes can only appear temporarily. In the following sections we will assume that x t < 1/ν at equilibrium, i.e. we will rule out the possibility of maximum corruption because it is unrealistic and cannot be a long-run equilibrium.
Political Economy Equilibrium
The levels of public investment i t and taxes T t are chosen through probabilistic voting.
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According to Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) , the maximization program of each party implements the maximum of the following weighted social welfare function: (1), (6), and K 0 given,
The parameter θ is the additional weight attached to the people in the rent-seeking sector. From probabilistic theory, it captures the responsiveness of voters to the change in utility. In particular, a group that has little ideological bias cares relatively more about economic policy. Such groups are therefore targeted by politicians and enjoy high political power. An alternative view is that households can gain political power by purchasing votes (see, for example, Docquier and Tarbalouti 2001) . If θ = 0 the problem can be interpreted as that of a benevolent social planner giving equal weight to all citizens; if θ = ∞, the social planner is the kleptocratic government envisioned
by Kanczuk (1998) , maximizing the discounted flow of income from corruption.
Solution Characteristics
To solve the voting problem we can write the following infinite Lagrangian:
3 Assume that there are two political parties, a and b. Each one proposes a policy. Instead of assuming that an individual votes for party a with probability one every time party a's policy gives him/her higher utility (as in the median voter model), probabilistic voting theory supposes that this vote is uncertain. More precisely, the probability that a person votes for party a is a smooth function of the utility gain associated with the implementation of policy a. This function captures the idea that voters care about an "ideology" variable in addition to the specific policy measure at hand. The presence of a concern for ideology, which is independent of the policy measure, makes the political choice less predictable (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) for different formalizations of this approach). The probability that a given voter will vote for party a increases gradually as the party's platform becomes more attractive. Party a maximizes its expected vote share. Party b acts symmetrically, and, at equilibrium, the two proposed policies coincide.
4 Notice that this maximization problem can alternatively be interpreted in the light of the lobbying literature (see Bernheim and Whinston 1986) .
The variable µ t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equality constraint (1). The variables φ t and ω t are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the constraints:
The multiplier φ t associated with the incentive constraint is the shadow price of corruption, reflecting the idea that the outcome of the vote has an effect on the type of activity chosen by households. For example, if voters decide to increase the amount of public investment, more households will work in the rent-seeking sector.
At each date, three cases are possible, depending on which constraint holds. The optimality conditions are derived in Appendix A for the three possible regimes. From these conditions we can analyze how the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule is modified by the presence of corruption. In the next section we consider the different regimes in turn.
Note that these cases stand for three regimes at a same equilibrium, and not for three different equilibria. They correspond to different values of the parameters at the same equilibrium. Multiple equilibria usually arise in decentralized economies when the level of corrupt activity influences its own rate of return (Bardhan 2006) , for example, when a high level of rent-seeking entails that it is an individual's interest to be a rent-seeker as well.
Benchmark Regime
We start with the regime where Equation (3) holds, so that the incentive constraint is not binding. There is no corruption and public investment is not distorted. We label this case without corruption the benchmark regime because it can be seen as a benchmark against which we can evaluate the cases with corruption. From the firstorder conditions analyzed in Appendix A we derive the following "Keynes-Ramsey" rule:
i.e. the higher the net marginal product of capital 1
, the more it pays to depress the current level of income to enjoy higher income in the future.
The benchmark case arises if condition (3) holds. This condition can be interpreted as an upper bound on the corruption technology ν. There is another condition for this regime to prevail, which is derived in the appendix from the positivity of the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ω t associated with x t ≥ 0. This condition is written:
It requires θ not to be too large. For a given corruption technology ν, if θ is large, rent-seekers have much more political weight than productive workers, and it is less likely that the equilibrium without corruption could prevail.
Balanced growth path
In the long-run, variables K t , I t and Y t all grow at the same rate n. All the per capita variables converge to a constant level. The following proposition establishes the essential properties of the equilibrium without corruption and the conditions for reaching it.
Proposition 1 Let the Modified Golden Rule stock of capital k ρ be given by:
If there exists a balanced growth path solution to the voting problem which satisfies
then there is no corruption, i.e. x = 0, and the long-run
Equation (9) is a Modified Golden Rule. The marginal productivity of capital is equal to the growth factor of the population divided by the discount factor ρ. Conditions (10) and (11) show that such a regime with no distortion will prevail if the corruption technology is not too efficient, and if the political weight of rent-seekers is not too high.
In the next section, we explore, through a numerical example, the zone in the space {ν, θ} for which this regime holds.
Distortion without Corruption
In this regime, the incentive constraint holds with equality at x t = 0. Intuitively, the government will have to lower investment i t in order to deter households from rent-seeking. There is less capital k in the economy as a consequence of the drop in investment i necessary to deter corruption. Corruption acts like a negative externality which can be limited at a certain cost. In Appendix A we compute a modified KeynesRamsey rule:
Compared to Equation (7), the last two terms on the right hand side are new and reflect the distortionary effect of potential corruption on investment. The interpretation is easier when we look at the rule at steady state, which leads to a modified "Modified Golden Rule" that incorporates corruption:
Compared to the benchmark regime there are two modifications. The discounted growth rate of the population is now multiplied by a factor smaller than one:
And the net marginal productivity of capital is equal to the sum of this smaller growth rate of population with a positive term depending on the shadow price of corruption. Comparing this sum on the right hand side to the simpler term (1 + n)/ρ of the benchmark model, we see that
Hence, if ν is large enough, i.e. if potential corruption is sufficiently harmful, the incentive constraint has a negative impact on investment in k, which allows corruption to be kept out of the economy.
Interior Regime
In this case, Constraint (3). Two forces work in opposite directions: the interest of having households working in the productive sector against the additional utility drawn from the presence of rent-seekers.
To better understand the role of the incentive constraint, we look at the optimal value of the corresponding multiplier, φ t , the shadow price of corruption. From the optimality conditions of Appendix A, we obtain:
The shadow price of corruption is the sum of three terms. The first term −θu[y t ] is the direct effect of x t on the objective function. For a correct interpretation of this term, we need to assume that the utility function is positive which requires σ > 1 with the CIES functional form. When corrupt people carry more weight (θ > 0), the cost of the constraint is decreased. The second term νρµ t+1 i t is positive and reflects the loss of investment and future capital because of corruption. This second term weighs more if the corruption technology (ν) is more efficient. The third term is negative: if there is more corruption, fewer people work in the productive sector, but their individual productivity is higher because of decreasing marginal returns to labor.
We computed the Modified Golden Rule in Appendix A. Unfortunately, the computations are very involved and do not allow clearcut results to be derived as was possible for the other regimes.
Numerical Illustration
To illustrate Proposition 1 as well as the properties of the different long-run regimes, we run a numerical example. We first give log-linear functional forms to our functions:
The technology parameter is set at α = 3/4.
Considering that one model period is equivalent to one year, we assume population growth at rate n = 0.005, a discount factor of 0.96, and depreciation rate δ = 0.04.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at σ = 2.
The benchmark regime arises when ν and θ are small enough. Conditions (10) and (11) can be written explicitly as: Table 1 gives three examples of steady states. Example A describes a benchmark regime where ν and θ satisfy the system above. There is no corruption (x = 0), the shadow price of corruption is zero too (φ = 0), and the stock of capital is determined by the Modified Golden Rule (9). In Example B, we assume the same low political weight attached to rent-seekers (θ = 1/4) but increase the efficiency of the corruption technology ν to ν = 9. The economy switches to a regime where corruption is still absent, but its possibility imposes a distortion on public investment. This is reflected by the fact that the shadow price of corruption is now positive and public investment is reduced. The capital stock and output are slightly reduced, compared to the benchmark. Finally, Example C is a case of an interior regime, which arises for high values of θ. In this case the rent-seekers have such a high political weight (θ = 3/2) that public investment is encouraged. Households spend 19% of their time on corruption activities.
Notice that investment i is very high but a large fraction (νx = 4 × 0.19 = 0.76) is diverted, implying that the stock of capital k is low. Looking at output in the three examples, we observe that A and B are associated with relatively high y, while example C describes a poorer economy. 
Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Strategy
From the theoretical model presented above, we can see that the level of corruption and income per capita depend on different parameters and that the relation between these parameters and the two dependent variables is different according to which regime fits.
The benchmark regime and the regime with distortion but no corruption correspond to countries with controlled corruption and a high growth rate, which have a low value of θ and a low or a high value of ν respectively. The interior regime is more likely to correspond to countries with high ν and θ, a low level of income growth and widespread corruption.
Hence, the model leads us to predict that the effects of parameters ν and θ on growth and equilibrium corruption should be weaker in countries with low θ and ν respectively.
In what follows, we present the data used to measure first the two dependent variables and then the parameters affecting them. We will introduce interaction terms between the variables measuring ν and θ in order to test the key predictions highlighted above. We present the empirical model and the estimation method before discussing the instrumental variables. Then, we present and interpret empirical results.
Data, Model and Method
The two indices used to approximate the level of corruption and the growth rate are described below.
• Corrup: The extent of corruption is represented in the model by νx, the share of spending which is diverted from its aim. As a proxy for νx, we use the "Control of Corruption" index (Corrup W B ) provided by the World Bank and presented by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) . The variable we use results from the following transformation: Corrup = 2.5 − Corrup W B . This index is an aggregate of the results of several surveys. Some of them are based on questions dealing with the ease of getting involved in corruption ν (e.g. "How well would you say the current government is handling the fight against corruption in the government?") and some others with the level of corruption x (e.g. "How many government officials do you think are involved in corruption?"). Hence, Corrup is a measure of the interaction term νx. Contrary to Transparency International's corruption perceptions index, the World Bank one makes it possible to conduct intertemporal, as well as cross-country, comparisons. However, measurement errors demand that we proceed with great caution 5 . Although it confuses the extent and the level of corruption, this index has the advantage of measuring mainly public corruption and, within public corruption, mainly political corruption. We use the World Bank's measure of corruption based on perception surveys, although it suffers measurement problems 6 . Other indices used to measure public corruption (e.g. from Business International (Ehrlich and Lui 1999) or Political Risk Services (Mauro 1997) ) have the same disadvantages. But the World Bank index reduces each source-specific bias by combining them.
5 In the following subsection, we make explicit the method we use to deal with the endogeneity implied by measurement errors.
6 To our knowledge, quantitative indices of political public corruption, not based on perceptions do not allow international comparisons since they are only available for Italy: Golden and Picci (2005) approximate the level of corruption in a given region by calculating the difference between the amounts of physical public capital and the amounts of investment cumulatively allocated for these public works.
• Growth: This index measures the logarithm of constant PPP GDP per capita growth on 10 years. It is obtained from data on the logarithm of constant PPP GDP per capita provided by the WDI database. Using Growth as a dependent variable and regressing it on a set of explanatory variables including ln Y 0 is equivalent to regressing ln Y on the same set of variables.
The set of parameters ν, θ, ρ, n and productivity Γ [.] are measured with the following variables.
1. Techcor: The effect of ν is estimated by using the Rule of Law index available in the Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS). This index is an aggregate of perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. To use the index as a proxy for ν, we assume that the technology of corruption is as inefficient as the legal (penal and judicial) system is. We operate the following transformation: T echcor = 2.5 − Rule of Law, so that the higher the variable Rule of Law, the higher is the probability of a corrupt public agent being caught and punished, and the weaker the technology of corruption (T echcor).
Polbias:
As a proxy for θ, that is the political weight given to rent-seekers in the objective function, we use an indicator of the lack of political rights taken from Freedom House. Few political rights for the population indicate a strong concentration of power in the hands of a very few. And those who hold the power are presumably rent-seekers (because votes are purchased as mentioned above).
Hence, if political rights are weak, power is concentrated in the hands of rentseekers, which means θ is high. We subtract 1 from the original index in order to obtain a variable ranging from 0 (if the country provides very extended political rights to its citizens) to 7 (if the citizens have no political rights). Figure 5 in Appendix B represents the countries in the plane {ν, θ}.
Patience:
This variable indicates the number of years the party of the chief executive has been in office, taken from Beck et al. (2001) . It is used as a proxy for the discount factor ρ. A "forward-looking" variable indicating in how many years the next elections will take place would have fitted better with the discount factor but, to the best of our knowledge, this is not available. Here we assume that political groups can predict their term of office relatively well. Thus, if the political group has been in power for a long time, which was expected, the group is more patient and values the future more than parties which expect to be in power for a shorter period.
Pop:
The rate of growth of the total population, taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database, gives us n.
Γ[.]:
We use two dummy variables: Tropic which is equal to 1 if the country is located between the tropic of Cancer and the tropic of Capricorn, 0 otherwise;
and Ldlock equal to 1 for landlocked countries, and to 0 otherwise. This enables us to control for geographic conditions affecting productivity Γ [.] .
We also introduce the logarithm of the 10 year-lagged constant PPP GDP per capita, ln Y 0 . This is provided by the WDI database. All these variables are imperfect measures of the parameters. This reinforces the risk of endogeneity biases, also due to simultaneity and to the omission of variables. We present the instruments we use to control for endogeneity below. Descriptive statistics for all the variables and the list of countries used in the econometric analysis are provided in Appendix B (see Tables 3,   4 and 5).
In the benchmark regime, the endogenous variables are not affected by small variations in ν and θ. As mentioned above, countries in such a situation also have more extended political rights and rule of law respectively. To control for this eventuality, we add an interaction term T echcor * P olbias in the list of regressors.
We estimate a restricted form system of two equations where each endogenous variable is a function of the measured parameters and initial conditions:
Corrup it = β 1 + β 2 T echcor it + β 3 P olbias it + β 4 T echcor * P olbias it + β 5 P atience it + β 6 P op it + β 7 T ropic it + β 8 Ldlock it + β 9 ln Y 0it + ρ it
Growth it = γ 1 + γ 2 T echcor it + γ 3 P olbias it + γ 4 T echcor * P olbias it + γ 5 P atience it + γ 6 P op it + γ 7 T ropic it + γ 8 Ldlock it + γ 9 ln Y 0it + ς it
Estimates are run on even-year data 7 for the period 1996 to 2004 on 62 countries using a three-stage least squares (3sls) procedure. We first estimate an unrestricted model (see Table 6 in Appendix B). At each step, we perform a Wald test that the least significant parameter of each equation is null. If the p-value of a coefficient is above 0.15, we reject the coefficient at the following step. Hence, at the end of the procedure, we retain a restricted model for which all the coefficients have a low p-value (below 0.15).
The three-stage least squares method has several advantages. First, it reduces simultaneity biases. If there is a correlation between the regressors and the error terms, 3sls estimators are still consistent, unlike ordinary least squares estimators. Second, 3sls
provide estimators correcting not only for the residuals' heteroskedasticity (residuals' variance depends on the technology of corruption and the extent of political rights because these partly reflect the quality of political and legal institutions) but also for the correlation between the residuals of two distinct equations in the system. Indeed, the correlation between the residuals of the regressions of corruption and growth is equal to −0.25 and significant at the 1% level: some omitted explanatory variables are common to the three equations. Taking into account such a correlation through 3sls between the residuals of different equations yields more efficient estimators than equation-by-equation 2sls or classical estimations of panel data. Finally, 3sls estimation is also preferable to fixed effects insofar as it preserves transversal information contained in the data and since our variables, in particular those of corruption, are quite stable over time.
As mentioned above, the variables T echcor, P olbias and P atience suffer from substantial measurement error with respect to the actual technology of corruption, the lack of political rights and the discount factor. Hence, for reinforcing the treatment of endogeneity, we introduce external instrumental variables which are used in the first stage of the procedure to provide the predicted values of endogenous variables, then considered as their instrumented values. These excluded instruments are defined as follows:
• antiq is an index of the depth of experience of state-level institutions, or state antiquity. It was developed by Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002) 8 and we use it here as an instrument for political and legal infrastructure. This relies on Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002)'s paper which documents the use of the state antiquity index as an appropriate instrument for institutional quality, and in particular for the index of social infrastructure developed by Hall and Jones (1999) .
• legsoc, legfr and legbr are dummies equal to 1 if the country's legal system has a socialist, a French or a British origin respectively 9 . Using the legal origin as an instrument for the rule of law follows La Porta et al. (1998) : their works highlight the greater capacity of British common law systems to protect property rights.
• polbiaslag is the ten-year lagged index of political rights.
• poplag is the ten-year lagged index of the growth rate of the population.
We also tried to include the percentage of natural resources exports in GDP in the set of instruments. This index is often used as an instrument for the level of corruption since abundant natural resources create strong incentives to rent-seeking, and hence to corruption (Leite and Weidmann 1999) . These exports being given as a percentage of GDP, we suspect this instrument of being too endogenous. Adding this variable does not change the main results but worsens the instrument validity tests.
We perform two tests for evaluating the validity of using instrumented estimations. The Sargan overidentification test and the Cragg-Donald (CD) F statistic (see Cragg and Donald 1993 and Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002 . These two tests are presented at the bottom of Table 2 . They both suggest that the instruments are valid. We also report the first-stage regressions in Appendix B (see Table 7 ). They suggest a few points. First, state antiquity reinforces a lack of democracy. At the same time, states which became independent more recently tend to have weaker legal systems -favoring corruption -and to be weaker democracies. When the state was colonized for a long time, a deeper experience of state-level institutions may strengthen mechanisms for circumventing the legal system as well as authoritarian regimes which flout citizens' political rights. But a longer experience of independent statehood and autonomy helps to build a stronger political and legal system. As regards the origin of the legal system, our results are in line with legal-origins theory comparing the effects of common law and civil law (La Porta et al. 1998, Beck and Levine 2003) . Indeed, legal systems with a French or socialist origin provide significantly less efficient legal regimes (in particular to protect property rights) than those of British origin. 
Results
The results of our main estimation (Model 3) are presented in Table 2 . As mentioned above, two tests were run to check that the instruments we used were valid. The coefficients associated with the explanatory variables indicate their marginal effects on the dependent variables. However, because we use an interaction term, T echcor * P olbias, the partial effects of T echcor and P olbias have to be calculated. The marginal effect of P olbias on the level of corruption is given by β 3 +β 4 T echcor for each country i. Figure 2 represents such an effect according to the quality of the legal system. Similarly, the marginal effects of T echcor and P olbias on GDP growth are equal to γ 2 +γ 4 P olbias and γ 3 + γ 4 T echcor respectively. These effects are shown in Figures 3 and 4. 9 These indicators are available on New York University Development Research Institute's web site. As expected, the technology of corruption (ν) appears to have a positive impact on the level of corruption and its coefficient is significant at the 1% level. When the judiciary does not manage to implement the law, corruption is made easier and less condemned, and its level raises. A failing legal system reinforces corruption but this effect gets lower as political power is increasingly concentrated (see Figure 1 ). In the same way, the lack of political rights (θ) is linked to higher levels of corruption as well, but it enhances the level of corruption significantly only in countries where the technology of corruption is poor, as shown in Figure 2 . In weak or non-democracies, political power is unevenly distributed, and it is likely that rent-seekers have more political weight, which makes the rent-seeking activity more attractive. Then the level of corruption depends on the quality of both the legal and political systems. But it seems that both determinants are substitutes rather than complements: a good technology of corruption, proxied by a weak rule of law, facilitates corruption all the more in a context of large political rights. This result suggests that the indicator used to approximate the level of corruption might measure not only effective corruption but also potential corruption. In the regression of growth, T echcor, standing for ν, has a negative and significant coefficient: whatever the extent of political rights in a country, the technology of corruption slows growth down. But the more concentrated political power, the more the absence of rule of law (easy access to corruption) blocks growth (see Figure 3) . Countries in this situation stand in the interior regime described above (with high values of ν and θ). On the opposite, small values of θ correspond to the regime with distortion but no corruption: a good predatory technology means a high potential corruption which leads voters to reduce public investment in order to deter corruption. This is also harmful to growth but less than an increase in public investment aiming at "feeding rent-seekers", which occurs in the interior regime. Similarly, as Figure 4 shows, the lack of political rights damages growth more as the legal system is less developed. At one extreme, in countries where the predatory technology is weak, there is neither potential nor effective corruption. Hence, even if political power is strongly concentrated, public investment is not distorted and the extent of political rights has no incidence on growth, as in the benchmark regime (left panel of Figure 4 ). At the opposite extreme, if the predatory technology is well developed, corruption is potentially high. When rent-seekers concentrate political power in their hands, corruption is effective and public investment is increased, which weakens growth, as in the interior regime (right panel of Figure 4 ). Simulating GDP per capita growth in Burundi, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe with the values of USA, Norway and Denmark respectively have higher effects if the value being simulated is ν rather than θ. If Burundi's extent of political rights were equal to those in USA, then Burundi's growth rate in 2000 would increase from 0.68% to 2.15 compared to 3.86% if it had the same technology of corruption. If the technology of corruption in Zimbabwe were as weak as in Denmark, its growth rate would rise from 1.05% to 2.72%, compared to only 1.87% if its political power was similarly distributed. Hence, an interesting result of our estimation is that improving the quality of the judicial system reduces corruption and favors growth more than extending political rights. This is perfectly in line with the result of Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) according to which democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes.
The coefficient of the initial level of GDP per capita is significant at the 1% level. The growth rate decreases when initial GDP per capita is higher. Then, all other things being equal, the population growth rate has a negative and significant impact on the level of corruption. As for patience, approximated by the number of years the party of the chief executive has been in office, it appears to have a positive and significant impact on the growth rate but a negative one on the level of corruption: the more impatient the government, the more extensive the level of public corruption and embezzlement and the weaker the growth rate. The two dummies controlling for geographic conditions have significant coefficients in the regression of growth rate. As expected, hard climatic conditions and being landlocked threaten growth.
Robustness Estimations
In this section, we provide robustness estimations so as to check that the results and mechanisms presented in the previous section are still valid with another set of instruments and with other specifications of the model. Results are reported in Table 3 .
We first modify the panel of instruments by introducing the logarithm of the number of years of independence of the state: yrind. It measures the autonomy of the political and legal system and its capacity to influence or resist foreign influence. Results of the estimation based on this set of instruments are presented in model 3.1. The significance and signs of explanatory variables are not altered. The global marginal effects of T echcor and P olbias on the level of corruption and on the growth rate are very similar to those obtained through our main estimation (model 3).
Then, in model 4, yearly dummies are added to the list of regressors to capture specific effects due to time variations. 1996 is the excluded yearly dummy variable. The yearly dummies are significant only in the regression of corruption. Their negative signs reveal that the level of corruption was substantially overestimated in 1996, the hypothesis of a sudden fall in the level of corruption all over the world after 1996 being doubtful.
However, taking into account such a gap in the index of corruption does not have any incidence on the main results commented above. Finally, model 4.1 combines the new specification including year dummies and the new set of instruments including yrind: results are not altered by such changes either.
Finally, in order to check that standard errors of the estimated coefficients were not artificially reduced by a large number of similar data points (corruption data are relatively persistent over time), we estimated the same system for every year separately. In a majority of cases, the effects of ν and θ on corruption and income growth remain significant, at least at the 10%-level.
Conclusion
Most of the theory of corruption focuses on incentives, information and enforcement determining corrupt practices, mainly due to market failures in a static context (Shleifer and Vishny 1993 , Banerjee 1997 , and Acemoglu and Verdier 2000 . The main contribution of our model is to bridge the gap between this mostly static theory of corruption and the standard theory of growth. In particular, we show how rent-seekers' political * * * , * * and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. "CD" stands for " Cragg-Donald". power and corruption technology affect the level of corruption at equilibrium as well as classical relationships such as the Modified Golden Rule. In addition to developing a dynamic general equilibrium model of corruption and growth, we distinguish two different aspects of corruption: the level of corruption, which is determined endogenously at equilibrium; and the predatory technology (an exogenous variable in the theory but instrumented in the econometrics) which indicates the ease with which resources can be captured.
One key prediction of the model is that, at the same equilibrium, several regimes may prevail according to the values of the institutional parameters. Each regime associates levels of corruption and income growth to a combination of institutional parameters.
We examine empirically to what extent these regimes apply to different countries. We also provide evidence that improving the quality of the legal and judicial system is more efficient to fight against corruption and its detrimental effect on growth than redistributing political power.
We estimate that both the poor quality of the legal system and the lack of political rights favor corruption. Then, we show that the detrimental effect easy access to corruption has on the growth rate is higher in countries where political power is strongly concentrated. Finally, we have quantified the effect of higher predatory technology and political weight of rent-seekers (approximated by the lack of political rights) on the level of corruption and GDP per capita. These effects are large. If Zimbabwe had Denmark's rule of law and democracy levels, its annual income growth would double and the level of corruption would decrease from 3.2 to 0.2, inferior to the Norwegian level.
A Solution to the Voting Problem
We follow McKenzie (1986) and de la Croix and Michel (2002) and use the Lagrangian of period t L t , which has the interest of being simpler and more intuitive (and yielding the same results as the infinite Lagrangian). The Lagrangian L t is composed of the terms of the infinite Lagrangian which depends on k t , i t and x t . Replacing U t by its value from (2) and V t = u[νi t − i t ], we obtain:
It is equal to the instantaneous utility plus the increase in the value of the capital stock, ρµ t+1 k t+1 − µ t (1 + n)k t minus the cost of the inequality constraints. For an optimal solution, the derivatives of L t with respect to the five variables are zero:
with
The multipliers of the inequality constraints should satisfy:
The transversality condition is:
At each date, four possible cases are a priori possible, depending on which constraint is binding. Among those, only three are logically possible. Let us consider these cases in turn, which we label by the sign of the vector (φ t , ω t ).
1. (0, +) This is the regime where Equation (3) holds, so that the incentive constraint is not binding. There is no corruption and public investment is not dis- 
Benchmark Regime
We first consider the regime where x t = 0, φ t = 0, and ω t > 0. Equation (3) holds and the incentive constraint is not binding. There is no corruption and public investment is not distorted. The first order conditions become
The Keynes-Ramsey rule can be derived by replacing µ t and µ t+1 in the first equation by their value computed from the second equation.
The last equation can be used to derive an expression for the multiplier ω t :
Imposing ω t > 0 on it gives an upper bound on the parameter θ:
which, after substituting the value of µ t+1 given by µ t+1 = u ′ [y t ]/ρ leads to equation (8) of the main text.
Distortion without Corruption
This is regime where x t = 0, φ t > 0, and ω t > 0. This case corresponds to a situation without corruption, but where Equation (3) 
A modified Keynes-Ramsey rule can be derived by replacing µ t and µ t+1 in the first equation by their value computed from the second equation.
Interior Regime: 0 > x t > 1 and φ t = 0 This is the interior regime with 0 < x t < 1/ν. The multiplier φ t > 0, but ω t = 0. When the incentive constraint holds with equality,
The first order conditions are:
The shadow price of corruption can be computed by solving the fifth equation for φ t :
We directly look at this equation at steady state:
. Notes: T-statistics in parentheses: * * * , * * and * denote coefficients which differ significantly from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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